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TO: Project Chief  
FROM: O-63  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Jan NEUMANN  
on 29 February 1956

GUL-O-1282  
5 March 1956.

Contact Report # 2.

VISITING ARRANGEMENTS:

1. O-63 met NEUMANN in the hall of the Deutscher Hof restaurant just as the latter was entering the dining room. The time was exactly 0900 hours, 29 February 1956. The meeting lasted until about 1130 hours when NEUMANN left to attend some private meeting. They left the dining room together and parted in the hall.

REMARKS:

1. None.

OPERATIONAL:

1. SUMM and his underground movement: NEUMANN made the acquaintance of SUMM when he was transferred to the VDMA camp in June 1954. Among all the other prisoners, SUMM appeared the most serious minded and interesting. During their conversations, however, both were very careful and at first only discussed problems of academic interest.
2. SUMM spoke perfect German; his father was a Consul General in VIENNA in 1922/3 - 1936 and SUMM attended school there. - The opinions of the prisoners varied as concerns political problems. Some insisted that the politicians who have escaped abroad must be immediately put to prison upon their return to the GDR. Others, the more lenient ones, claimed that this would not be necessary since these politicians would of their own free will disappear from the political scene.
3. As time went on, NEUMANN and SUMM became friends and consequently their debates became more sincere and dealt with more concrete subjects. SUMM's opinions at that time (i.e. prior to the GEMVA conference) were as follows: the USA is in a very strong position. During the conference, the USA will give the USSR an ultimatum and will force the Russians to concessions, since they will not be willing to risk war. These concessions will consist in the establishing of the so-called "security belt" formed by a number of bumper states, i.e. the Baltic republics, Poland, the GDR, and Hungary. This was the conception on which SUMM was building his political line. He claimed that the elections which would then take place in these bumper states (under UNO supervision) would have to be prepared beforehand. With this in mind, he organized in the GDR some 140 reliable

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persons twenty of whom are in the various forced labor camps and 120 at liberty. Contact with these is maintained through the civilian employees of the camps. - On the other hand, however, some other prominent prisoners claimed that the elections would spell the downfall of Communism in the GDR even without preparations. This, for example, was the opinion of one Dr. Frau WITTE (or WITKA).

6. In connection with this underground organization, SUMM briefed MEUWIRTH to contact SCHMIDTBERG, LUBOWITZ, ROOVER Sr. and Jr., BRILLO, WICHOLS, BYRN, WIRKS and BAUER and to inform them of the situation in the GDR. He also gave MEUWIRTH a password (see also Contact Report # 1). At first, he only gave him the first part of the password, "MOLAVIA". MEUWIRTH, however, insisted on being told when he should give as a reference when he contacts top GDR intelligence officials in FRANKFURT/A, whereupon SUMM, after prolonged hesitation, gave him also the second part of the password, "MAGANON", and asked him to explain to the pertinent authorities that SUMM had given him this part of the password only because the circumstances were exceptional, and that this must not be considered a breach of security. - MEUWIRTH saw SUMM for the last time on 6 September 1955. Until then, everything was in best order.

COMMENT: It is difficult to form a clear picture of the situation on the basis of the available information. However, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the whole matter is much less important than it would appear at the first glance. Regardless of the fact that the whole action was mounted on the basis of theoretical assumptions, with wishful thinking as motivation, it is in G-2's opinion almost impossible that the whole case would have secured the attention and control of the StB, although MEUWIRTH swore by SUMM's reliability and security mindedness. Then, however, the case is considered as a political action and not an espionage operation; the CT aspect loses its edge. The question must then be considered whether the political background as it existed in 1955 is still topical today.

7. Recruitment of agents for the StB: The most prominent among all the prisoners who have been offered cooperation by the StB was Dr. Fritz KOLLMEIER. In 1933, KOLLMEIER was one of the organizers of the DEUTSCHER Bund. In 1938 he was active in the setting up of the Deutsches Freikorps. After FRANK's departure for PRAGUE, he became Reichsbereichsleiter der Arbeit fuer Deutschland. In party matters, he deputized for HENKEL.
8. In about May-June 1953, about 15 prominent prisoners were taken to the StB HQ, KOLLMEIER among them. After his return KOLLMEIER reported to MEUWIRTH. The StB had suggested to him that he act as stool pigeon among the prisoners, which KOLLMEIER promptly refused as being below his dignity. He did, however, accept other major tasks given to him by the StB. MEUWIRTH does not know the nature of these tasks.

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- 3 -

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9. At present, KOELLNER is already cooperating with GEMLEN when he informed of the StB's offer. In NEUBIRTH's opinion - although they are good friends - it is necessary to be on one's guard in KOELLNER's presence. Allegedly, KOELLNER is a man who grew up in strained circumstances, has strong socialist tendencies and always tended towards the left. NEUBIRTH compared KOELLNER to FINKLINER who turned traitor in the decisive moment, or to BRYAN who might also turn traitor. NEUBIRTH claims that without any doubt KOELLNER will soon become an important political figure in Western Germany.
10. Another prisoner who had been offered cooperation by the StB was Robert ULLMANN. His case was similar to that of KOELLNER, but NEUBIRTH does not know whether ULLMANN had admitted his cooperation with the StB upon his arrival in Germany. ULLMANN is a technician and the StB were promising him an important job in Western Germany where he could be most useful to them.
11. Apart from a number of less important persons, the following have been offered cooperation by the StB: Dr. LANGMANN-SCHNEIDER, Dr. Heinz LAMMEL, Dr. RICHTLITZER.

COMMENT: This information would be of importance also for the West German Abwehrdienst. - NEUBIRTH described also his own experience with the StB in the matter of cooperation. O-3 intends to make a re-earring of NEUBIRTH's experiences with the StB which would ensure a detailed account of the happenings.

12. Persons favorably disposed towards cooperation with us: OMEGA (first name probably Robert) is the chief representative of the CGM mining industry for Western Germany. He often travels between these two countries. At present he is staying in DAKENBURG. NEUBIRTH characterizes him as a businessman who would do anything for money. According to NEUBIRTH it is possible that OMEGA had received an offer of collaboration from the StB, he feels certain, however, that OMEGA would also accept an offer by the AIS if this were advantageous financially.

13. Name Checks: Traces are requested on the following individuals:

OMEGA Robert - see paragraph 12. For Project file check see memorandum from O-55 to LEE, dated 21 February 1956.  
 FRITZ or MEIERA Frau, Dr. - see paragraph 5.  
 ULLMANN Robert, Ing. - see paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10.  
 LANGMANN-SCHNEIDER Frau, Dr. - see paragraph 11.  
 LAMMEL Heinz, Dr. - see paragraph 11.  
 RICHTLITZER Frau, Dr. - see paragraph 11. Project file check negative.

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14. NEUBIRTH claims that the treatment of the skin cancer from which he suffers will only take a few weeks. Apart from that, he has influenza at present.

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ADMINISTRATION:

15. O-63 asked NEUWIRTH to make note of all the expenditures connected with his meetings with O-63 and to present the account to O-63 on the earliest occasion.

COMMUNICATIONS:

16. The next meeting between O-63 and NEUWIRTH was fixed for 19 March 1956 at 0700 hours in the ZENFOLINER grounds opposite the Deutscher Hof restaurant. NEUWIRTH was instructed to wait until 0905 hours and to go away if O-63 failed to come. In that case, a substitute meeting would definitely take place on 30 March at the same time and place. When NEUWIRTH sees O-63, he will follow him into one of the side streets and wait until O-63 signals that it is safe to join him.
17. NEUWIRTH's address is as follows: WALKERHOF 13b, Grosser Weg 28.

SECURITY:

18. In O-63's opinion, the meeting was also from the CS point of view. Several people were present at the restaurant, but they were all seated further away. Several times, O-63 had to ask NEUWIRTH not to talk loudly, and especially to avoid such expressions as "Czechoslovak, Communist, Gestapo, etc.", so as not to reveal the subject matter of their conversation.
19. As soon as it is decided that we shall remain in contact with NEUWIRTH, the security aspect will have to receive more attention, as in other cases. There is no doubt that NEUWIRTH was a prominent person during the time of the first CSB and that the Stb are aware of his presence in Germany. It is almost equally certain that soon he will become known also in eastern Germany, which possibility must be borne in mind.
20. O-63 will present his security suggestions orally to NEUWIRTH for approval. The decision will then be reported under the SECURITY heading in one of the future Contact Reports.
21. The VICOVSKY case: When asked by O-63 whether he had ever heard the name VICOVSKY, NEUWIRTH answered in the affirmative. O-63 then asked him whether he knew that VICOVSKY had wanted to send a message to Germany through some would-be spy and that the action had failed. Without hesitation, NEUWIRTH asked when this was supposed to have happened. This was an unusual reaction since the would-be spy was through whom VICOVSKY wanted to send his message was NEUWIRTH himself. O-63 did not mention this in order to give NEUWIRTH the chance of denying the case if he wanted to do so. Then, in order to make certain that NEUWIRTH was lying deliberately, O-63 said that allegedly this had happened in November - December 1955 (O-63 knew that by then NEUWIRTH was no longer at the VOJNA camp). It was obvious that NEUWIRTH was greatly relieved when he heard this, and being probably under the impression that we knew very little about the case, he calmly stated that he knew nothing whatever about it.

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- 3 -

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At present, KOLLNER is already cooperating with GEMIN when he informed of the StB's offer. In MEUWIRTH's opinion - although they are good friends - it is necessary to be on one's guard in KOLLNER's presence. Allegedly, KOLLNER is a man who grew up in strained circumstances, has strong socialist tendencies and always tended towards the left. MEUWIRTH compared KOLLNER to FRIEDLINDER who turned traitor in the decisive moment, or to NYAN who might also turn traitor. MEUWIRTH claims that without any doubt KOLLNER will soon become an important political figure in Western Germany.

10. Another prisoner who had been offered cooperation by the StB was Robert DI MANN. His case was similar to that of KOLLNER, but MEUWIRTH does not know whether DI MANN had admitted his cooperation with the StB upon his arrival in Germany. DI MANN is a technician and the StB were promising him an important job in Western Germany where he would be most useful to them.
11. Apart from a number of less important persons, the following have been offered cooperation by the StB: Dr. LANDMANN-KRUMH, Dr. Heinz LAUBER, Dr. M. MILLER.

COMMENT: This information would be of importance also for the West German Abwehrdienst. - MEUWIRTH described also his own experience with the StB in the matter of cooperation. O-4) intends to make a recording of MEUWIRTH's experiences with the StB which would ensure a detailed account of the happenings.

12. Persons favorably disposed towards cooperation with us: GREGOR (first name Dr. Fritz Robert) is the chief representative of the GDR mining industry for Western Germany. He often travels between these two countries. At present he is staying in PAYKUTH. MEUWIRTH characterizes him as a businessman who would do anything for money. According to MEUWIRTH it is possible that GREGOR had received an offer of collaboration from the StB, he feels certain, however, that GREGOR would also accept an offer by the AIZ if this were advantageous financially.

13. Name Checks: Traces are requested on the following individuals:

GREGOR Robert - see paragraph 12. For Project file check see correspondence from O-55 to LZ, dated 21 February 1956.

WITTE as HUGO, Sm, Dr. - see paragraph 5.

WITTE Fritz, Dr. - see paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10.

DI MANN Robert Ing. - see paragraph 10.

LANDMANN-KRUMH Sm, Dr. - see paragraph 11.

LAUBER Heinz, r. - see paragraph 11.

MILLER Fritz, Dr. - see paragraph 11. Project file check negative.

## RE MARKS

14. MEUWIRTH claims that the treatment of the skin cancer from which he suffers will only take a few weeks. Apart from that, he has influenza at present.

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- 4 -

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ADMINISTRATION:

16. O-63 asked NEUMIRN to make note of all the expenditure connected with his meetings with O-63 and to present the account to O-63 on the earliest occasion.

COMMUNICATIONS:

16. The next meeting between O-63 and NEUMIRN was fixed for 19 March 1954 at 0900 hours in the OHNPFOLLINGER arcade opposite the Deutscher Hof restaurant. NEUMIRN was instructed to wait until 0905 hours and to go away if O-63 failed to come. In that case, a substitute meeting would definitely take place on 30 March at the same time and place. When NEUMIRN sees O-63, he will follow him into one of the side streets and wait until O-63 signals that it is safe to join him.
17. NEUMIRN's address is as follows: WALDENHAINSTR 13b, Greenway Reg 28.

SECURITY:

18. In O-63's opinion, the meeting was clean from the OS point of view. Several people were present at the restaurant, but they were all seated farther away. Several times, O-63 had to ask NEUMIRN not to talk loudly, and especially to avoid such expressions as "Comrade", "Communist", "Gastepo", etc., so as not to reveal the subject matter of their conversation.
19. As soon as it is decided that we shall remain in contact with NEUMIRN, the security aspect will have to receive more attention, as in other cases. There is no doubt that NEUMIRN was a prominent person during the time of the First OS and that the STB are aware of his presence in Germany. It is almost equally certain that soon he will become known also in eastern Germany, which possibility must be borne in mind.
20. O-63 will present his security suggestions orally to RICHARD for approval. The decision will then be reported under the SECURITY heading in one of the Future Contact Reports.
21. The VICOVSKI case: When asked by O-63 whether he had ever heard the name VICOVSKI, NEUMIRN answered in the affirmative. O-63 then asked him whether he knew that VICOVSKI had wanted to send a message to Germany through some would-be amnesiac and that the action had failed. Without hesitation, NEUMIRN asked when this was supposed to have happened. This was an unnatural reaction since the would-be amnesiac through whom VICOVSKI wanted to send his message was NEUMIRN himself. O-63 did not mention this in order to give NEUMIRN the chance of denying the case if he wanted to do so. Then, in order to make certain that NEUMIRN was lying deliberately, O-63 said that allegedly this had happened in November - December 1955 (O-63 knew that by then NEUMIRN was no longer at the VOJNA camp). It was obvious that NEUMIRN was greatly relieved when he heard this, and being probably under the impression that we knew very little about the case, he calmly stated that he knew nothing whatever about it.

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... asked MEINERTH to make note of all the expenditures connected with his meetings with O-63 and to prevent the ascent to O-63 on the earliest occasion.

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The next meeting between O-63 and MEINERTH was fixed for 19 March 1954 at 10:00 hours in the JOSEFILLNER arcade opposite the Deutscher Hof restaurant. MEINERTH was instructed to wait until 0905 hours and to go away if O-63 failed to come. In that case, a substitute meeting would definitely take place on 30 March at the same time and place. Then MEINERTH sees O-63, he will follow him into one of the side streets and wait until O-63 signals that it is safe to join him.

MEINERTH's address is as follows: SAIDENBURG 11b, Grunewald Weg 18.

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In O-63's opinion, the meeting was clean from the CG point of view. Several people were present at the restaurant, but they were all seated further away. Several times, O-63 had to ask MEINERTH not to talk loudly, and especially to avoid such expressions as "Comradeship, Communist, Gorko, etc.", and not to reveal the subject matter of their conversation.

... as it is decided that we shall remain in contact with MEINERTH, the security secret will have to receive more attention, as in other cases. There is a small ... person during the time of ... his presence in Germany. It is ... he will become known also in Western Germany ...

... will be ... suggestions orally to ... for approval. ... then is reported under the SECURITY heading in one of ...

... asked by O-63 whether he had ever heard the name ... answered in the affirmative. O-63 then asked him whether he knew that ... had wanted to send a message to Germany through ... and that the action had failed. Without hesitation, ... stated that this was supposed to have happened. This was an unusual reaction since the would-be messenger through whom ... wanted to send his message was ... himself. O-63 did not mention this in order to give ... the chance of denying the case if he wanted to do so. ... to make certain that MEINERTH was going deliberately, O-63 said that allegedly this had happened in November - December 1955 (O-63 knew that by then MEINERTH was no longer at the VOER camp). It was obvious that MEINERTH was greatly relieved when he heard this, and being completely under the impression that we know very little about the case, he calmly stated that he knew nothing whatever about it.

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COMMENT: O-63 did not know when all this had actually taken place; he had, however, in the meantime heard from O/SUHL-1 that it happened in April 1975. At the same time, however, O/SUHL-1 had said that HEUVIRTH had not betrayed VINCOWSKI deliberately, but that there was indiscretion on both sides. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to find out why HEUVIRTH was trying to keep the case a secret from us. O-63 has the following suggestion: that a report be written in English in the form of a memorandum describing the VINCOWSKI case; the addressee's and informant's names would be fictitious, but VINCOWSKI's and HEUVIRTH's true names will be used. O-63 will then submit this paper to HEUVIRTH for comment.

72. HEUVIRTH enquired about O-63's origin and O-63 gave him the following cover story: born in Hungary in 1933, in 1959 emigrated to the GDR with parents (he was then 16 years old).

GABR. OFFICER'S COMMENT:

73. This meeting showed that HEUVIRTH is not as adverse towards cooperation with the AIB as he would have us believe during the first meeting. It seems that he would accept an offer of cooperation as a spy and his only condition would be that he does not become compromised before the Germans. However, O-63 sees that HEUVIRTH's field lies elsewhere than in intelligence. He told HEUVIRTH so stressing that although he himself would like to make the most of HEUVIRTH's experiences, he would recommend that in the interest of the fight against Communism HEUVIRTH try and find a place for himself in journalism or politics. If, however, HEUVIRTH would at the same time be willing to render occasional services to us, this would be a great asset. HEUVIRTH agreed with this suggestion even when O-63 told him that the field of our interest is comparatively narrow, i.e. to obtain information from behind the Iron Curtain and everything that supports this endeavor. That is what makes it difficult for O-63 to guess at HEUVIRTH's motivation. There are the following two possibilities:

- a) HEUVIRTH's standing with some of the West German politicians is poor, possibly because of information supplied on him by other prominent persons; consequently, in his cooperation with the AIB, he sees a backing for himself and a firm basis for his future activities;
- b) HEUVIRTH himself found out that it will not be so easy as he believed and had us believe for him to incorporate himself into the German economic life, and expects that his cooperation with the AIB would represent a financial asset.

74. After having been told by O-63 that we are more interested in concrete data from the GDR or from any of the countries behind the Iron Curtain than in the plans of former politicians or contributions to anti-Communist propaganda, HEUVIRTH suggested that on the basis of the reports made by the many nameless he would compile a detailed report on the development

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of the program production in the CIA. This would entail a visit by him of some of his former co-prisoners who had been working in the program since. - Here, O-63 will request RICHARD's opinion.

75. O-63 asked KUSLITZ to make a recording of all the information he has to give according to a prearranged schedule. KUSLITZ agreed and asked whether he may take the recorder home where he can work better. The schedule will be elaborated by O-63 in agreement with RICHARD.

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